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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
alarmed by the hardships imposed on a defendant by double prose-
cution and should be ready to re-examine Lanza.8
3
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Obscenity
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
continue the case by case development of the constitutional stand-
ards to be applied in obscenity cases.'
In the first case, the manager of a motion picture theatre was
convicted of violating the Ohio obscenity statute2 by possessing and
exhibiting a French film, The Lovers.' He waived jury trial and his
conviction by a court of three judges was affirmed by the Ohio
Court of Appeals4 and the Supreme Court of Ohio.' The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction in Jacobellis v. Ohio.6
" In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), the Court held that
through the passage of the Smith Act Congress has occupied the field of
sedition so as to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
This opinion indicated that the Court is looking for congressional intent to
pre-empt the field so as to avoid the harsh burden of double prosecution.
However, in 1959, the Court reiterated the Lanza doctrine in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, and Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented. Id. at 150. Black
emphasized that state prosecution should be upheld only when the federal
government had no vital interest in preventing the crime and if there were
a conflict of interests, state prosecution should be pre-empted so as to avoid
double prosecution. Pre-emption seems too harsh. It predicates state sub-
ordination and diminishes the prerogatives of the states. A more suitable
solution would be for legislatures of both governments to enact pleas in bar
whereby a former prosecution for the same act would prohibit a second
trial.
'For a criticism of the Court's failure to establish a definite test in
obscenity cases, see Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Ob-
scenity, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 834, 835 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Gerber].
The opposite view is taken in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rxv. 5, 121
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure].
2 "No person shall knowingly . .. exhibit . . . or have in his possession
or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious . . . motion picture
film ... ." OIro REv. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1963).
"'The Lovers' involves a woman bored with her life and marriage
who abandons her husband and family for a young archaeologist with whom
she has suddenly fallen in love. There is an explicit love scene in the last
reel of the film, and the State's objections are based almost entirely upon
that scene." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964).
'State v. Jacobellis, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 175 N.E.2d 123 (Ct. App.
1961).
State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).
8378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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The second case, A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,7
arose when, acting under a Kansas statute,' the state Attorney Gen-
eral obtained an order from a district court judge which directed
the sheriff to seize certain books at the business premises of a
magazine dealer. The Attorney General had filed an information
identifying fifty-nine novels by title. With the information he sub-
mitted copies of seven novels, six of which were named among
those specified in the information. All fifty-nine titles specified in
the information and the seven novels furnished to the judge were
identified on the cover by the legend "This is an original Nightstand
Book." The judge conducted a forty-five minute ex parte inquiry,
"scrutinized" the books, passages of which had been marked by the
Attorney General, and stated that the books were apparently ob-
scene, giving the court reasonable grounds to believe that all "Night-
stand" books would fall into the same category.9 Thirty-one of
the titles named in the information were found on the premises of
the dealer and all copies of those titles, totaling 1,715 books, were
seized. The thirty-one titles were found to be obscene, and the
court ordered all copies destroyed. The Supreme Court of Kansas
affirmed,"0 the Supreme Court reversed.
Cases involving alledgedly obscene material will arise, typically,
in one of two contexts. Either an individual will be charged in the
traditional criminal proceeding for some dealing with the material,
in which case the fact of obscenity becomes one element of the
proof," or the material itself is questioned in a form of in rem pro-
1378 U.S. 205 (1964).8 KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-1102c (Supp. 1961).
The essence of these books may be ascertained with great celerity,
so replete are they with passages descriptive of sexual activities
running the gamut from ordinary intercourse to lesbianism, sadism,
public displays, and group orgies, and so lacking are they of any
other content. Moreover, they are so standardized that a judge's
estimate concerning the contents of absent books from an examina-
tion of seven books before him could be almost as surefire as a
similar estimate of the character of unseen Mickey Mouse comic
books based on a perusal of seven issues.
378 U.S. at 220 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10 191 Kan. 13, 379 P.2d 254 (1963).
" There is at least a philosophic argument that nothing is truly obscene
and that a distinction must be drawn between the terms "obscene in fact"
and "obscene in law," the former being non-existent, the latter indicating
a judicial determination that certain material does not meet standards to
be enforced by the particular court. See Miller, Obscenity and the Law of
Reflection, 51 Ky. L.J. 577 (1963). The philosophic lists will not be entered.
As used herein the phrase "obscene in fact" and like terms refer to the
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ceeding before or after limited distribution. Jacobellis is an ex-
ample of the former, Quantity of Books of the latter. Justices
Black and Douglas maintain that the procedural setting is im-
material, inasmuch as both the criminal and the in ren action result
in an abridgment of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments.' 2 The in rent procedure also carries
a connotation of prior restraint that may provide a basis for decision
on first amendment grounds without the obscenity question being
reached.1
3
But because the Court has been unwilling or unable to settle
upon any single ground for decision, the cases dealing with obscenity
handed down since 1957 have produced a series of multi-opinioned
decisions unmatched in any other field of constitutional law. The
Supreme Court first applied "modern standards" in obscenity cases
in that year.' 4 In deciding the consolidated cases of Roth v. United
States and Alberts v. California,5 the Court, in an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Brennan in which four others joined, substantially
adopted the Model Penal Code definition of obscenity,'" and specifi-
cally rejected the test first expounded in the early English case,
Regina v. Hicklin,'7 which "allowed material to be judged merely
establishment through the judicial process that the material in question is
such as to be proscribed by statute.
1"Marcus v. Search Warrent of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 738 (1961)
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78 (1961) (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J.,
and Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959)
(Black, J., concurring); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the
Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 690, 697 (1959) (Black, J., concurring;
Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting); Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 446 (1957) (Douglas, J., joined
by Black, J., dissenting).
" Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 222-25 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Slough & McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom, 8 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 279, 302 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Slough & McAnany].
15354 U.S. 476 (1957).
We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of
obscenity developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I.,
Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), viz.:
"... A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in
nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond cus-
tomary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters .... .
Id. at 487 n.20. Contra, id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., separate opinion).
"T [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
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by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptable
persons."" Substituted was a test determining "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."" It has been suggested that the adoption of this defini-
tion required some judicial leapfrogging ° and that the test pro-
mulgated in the Model Penal Code and in Roth are not, in fact, the
same.2' Nonetheless, the majority found that the trial judges in
Roth2" and Alberts2 had used substantially the same test as that
8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957).
'Id. at 489.
20 "There is a possibility ... that Mr. Justice Brennan may have been
trying to bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Cole by
the tour de force of declaring that it was already there." Schwartz, Criminal
Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 8, 11 (1957).
1 Gerber 838-40.
"' Roth was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York of violating the federal statute prohibiting the mailing
of obscene material. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957).
The conviction was affirmed, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956), and heard on
certiorari. One of the counts of the indictment
singled out one issue of a quarterly entitled American Aphrodite
which contained contributions by Herbert Ernest Bates, John
Cournos, Pierre Louys, Henry Miller and other authors of popular
works .... [Other counts] involved advertisements for American
Aphrodite, Photo and Body, and Good Times.... [Another count]
contained an advertisement for Good Times. Apparently the jury
was convinced that American Aphrodite was obscene.
Slough & McAnany 306 n.98.
[T]he trial judge instructed the jury ... . "The test is not whether
it would arouse sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in those
comprising a particular segment of the community .... The test
in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication con-
sidered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all
those whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you determine its
impact upon the average person in the community."
Roth v. United States, supra at 490.
"Alberts was convicted in a municipal court in California by a judge
sitting without a jury of violation of a state statute proscribing the wilfull
distribution of obscene or indecent writings. Id. at 479 n.2 The conviction
was affirmed, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955), and was up on
appeal. The material in question consisted of
booklets bearing such titles as The Prostitute and Her Lover, The
Picture of Conjugal Love, Male Homosexuals Tell Their Stories,
and The Love Affair of a Priest and a Nun. Hundreds of items
were seized, including indecent pamphlets, bondage pictures, photo-
graphs of nude and scantily clad women, stereo slides, and mailing
lists.
Slough & McAnany 306. "[T]he trial judge applied the test ...whether
the material has 'a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers
by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.'" Roth v. United
States, supra note 21, at 486. "In addition ... the trial judge indicated
1964]
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announced by the Court and affirmed the convictions."' The question
of obscenity as a matter of fact was not reached.25 Only Mr. Justice
Harlan mentioned the matter.28 Judicial determination of obscenity
in fact was postponed.
On the same day that Roth and Alberts were decided, the Court,
in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Browny7 upheld the constitutionality of
a New York statute28 providing injunctive relief to prevent the sale
of obscene material.29 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by four
others, wrote in the majority opinion that there was little difference
between the effect of the injunctive relief provided in the New York
procedure with its concomitant safeguards" and the criminal stat-
that, as the trier of facts, he was judging each item as a whole as it would
affect the normal person." Id. at 489-90.
"'Mr. Chief Justice Warren concurred in the results but found the
language of the majority too broad. Id. at 494. Mr. Justice Harlan con-
curred in the result as to Alberts but dissented as to Roth on the ground
that the federal statute was invalid as against the first amendment guarantees
of freedom of expression. Id. at 496. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom
Mr. Justice Black joined, dissented in both cases on the grounds that both
the federal and the state statutes improperly abridged those guarantees.
Id. at 508.
"5 "[B]oth the Alberts and Roth cases reached the United States Supreme
Court at a very high level of abstraction-a level so high that the facts
of the two cases had become literally irrelevant. And both were argued
on this level." Lockhart & McClure 25. "An exception is Albert's belated
contention that some of the books he handled were not obscene." Id. at 25
n.112, citing Brief for Appellant.
' 354 U.S. at 508 (separate opinion). He found that the material in-
volved in Roth was not hard-core pornography.
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
2 8 N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. § 22-a.
"' The material in question was a series of books entitled Nights of
Horror. The opinion of the trial court said:
"Nights of Horror" makes but one "contribution" to literature.
It serves as a glossary of terms describing the private parts of the
human body ... the emotions sensed in illicit sexual climax and
various forms of sadistic, masochistic and sexual perversion ...
The authors have left nothing to fantasy or to the unimaginative
mind. The volumes are vividly detailed and illustrated. The many
drawings that embellish these stories are obviously intended to
arouse unnatural desire and vicious acts. Violence-criminal, sexual
-degradation and perversion-are the sole keynote. ... In short,
the volumes.., before me are obscene and constitute pornography
--"dirt for dirt's sake."
Burke v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 208 Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735, 742-43
(1955).
"' The statute provides for trial of the issue of obscenity one day after
joinder of the issue and for decision within two days after the trial is
complete. After service of a summons and complaint anyone selling or
distributing the material is charged with knowledge of its contents. If a
final injunction is ordered the material must be surrendered or it is subject
to seizure. See N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. § 22-a.
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utes. approved in Roth.8 The case brought forth three dissenting
opinions. Chief Justice Warren felt that the manner of use, that
is, the conduct of the individual, should be judged rather than the
quality of the material. He distinguished the criminal statutes ap-
proved in Roth from the injunctive procedure in question in that
the latter imposed a prior restraint violative Of the Constitution."
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black, argued for re-
versal on two grounds: first, that the injunction pendente lite gave
the state censorship power; second, that restraining distribution by
equity decree violates the first amendment.8" Mr. Justice Brennan
objected only to the fact that under the New York procedure there
was no provision for a jury determination of the fact of obsceni-
ty." The appellants did not challenge the finding of obscenity and
the nature of the material was not discussed by the Court.8"
Finally, this same day produced a per curiam opinion5" wherein
the Court upheld the the constitutionality of a Newark, New Jersey,
ordinance' which, in effect, banned burlesque shows.88 The case
arose as a declaratory judgment action and the question of obsceni-
ty was not presented.89 The Court cited Roth and Kingsley Books
without comment and the case therefore furnished no further in-
sight into the doctrine set forth in the day's major obscenity deci-
sions.
Similar treatment was afforded three cases considered during
the next term of the Court. Citing only Roth or Alberts in per
curiam opinions, the Court reversed United States Courts of Appeals
" In fact, said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the injunctive remedy is to be
preferred because the defendent is not subject to criminal prosecution with-
out prior warning. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442
(1957).
82 Id. at 445.
88Id. at 446.
8,Id. at 447.
'5 Id. at 439.
" Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957),
affirming 22 N.J. 472, 126 A.2d 340 (1956).
" See Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 126
A.2d 340 (1956), afd, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
'8 Ibid.
89 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the appellants
raised two issues-vagueness and freedom of expression. And once
again these issues were presented to the court at a high level of ab-
straction, for ... [the appellants] had instituted their action before
the city had made any attempt to enforce the ordinances.
Lockhart & McClure 31.
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decisions which had held obscene a motion picture 0 (The Game of,
Love),41 imported magazines42 (including International Journal),"
a magazine for homosexuals44 (One) ,4 and two domestic publica-
tions46 (Sunshine & Health and Sun).4' The cases indicated what
40 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, reversing 244 F.2d
432 (7th Cir. 1957).
" [F]rom beginning to end, the thread of the story is supercharged
with a current of lewdness generated by a series of illicit sexual
intimacies and acts. In the introductory scenes a flying start is made
when a 16 year old boy is shown completely nude on a bathing
beach in the presence of a group of younger girls. On that plane
the narrative proceeds to reveal the seduction of this boy by a
physically attractive woman old enough to be his mother. Under
the influence of this experience and an arrangement to repeat it,
the boy thereupon engages in sexual relations with a girl his own
age. The erotic thread of the story is carried, without deviation
toward any wholesale idea, through scene after scene. The narra-
tive is graphically pictured with nothing omitted except those sexual
"consummations which are plainly suggested but meaningfully
omitted and thus, by the very fact of omission, emphasized. The
words spoken in French are reproduced in printed English on the
lower edge of the moving film. None of it palliates the effect of
the scenes portrayed.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1957).
"2 Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957) (per curiam), vacaling
judgment, 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957), affirnng United States v. 4200
Copies of Int'l journal, 134 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
" [O]f the twenty-seven publications introduced in evidence as ex-
hibits for the plaintiff, twenty have on the front-cover prominently
displayed nude pictures of well-developed, shapely young women.
One would have to be naive, indeed, not to appreciate the commer-
cial value of displaying such frontcover material on the news stands.
Although an avowed purpose of the books is to explain the nudist
movement, its principles and its practices, there are relatively very
few photographs of the mixed groups of all ages which ordinarily
would be found in a nudist park. The great preponderance of the
illustrations depicts shapely, well-developed young women appearing
in the nude, mostly in front exposures.
'United States v. 4200 Copies of Int'l Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D.
Wash. 1955).
"One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772
(9th Cir. 1957).
"The picture and the sketches are obscene and filthy by prevailing
standards. The stories "All This and Heaven Too," and "Not Til
the End," pages 32-36 .. .relate to the activities of homosexuals.
... Such stories are obscene, lewd and lascivious. They are offen-
sive to the moral senses, morally depraving and debasing. Such
literature cannot be classed as historical, scientific and educational
for any class of persons. Cheap pornography is a more appropriate
classification.
One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 1957).
" Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing
249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
'These magazines contain photographs of naked men, women and
children-principally women-clearly revealing ... portions of the
[Vol. 43
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the Court believed was not obscene, but did not furnish reasons for
the beliefs."
The Court did not again consider a case touching upon ob-
scenity until 1959 when, in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the Univ. of N.Y.4 1 it found that the refusal to license the film
Lady Chatterley's Lover50 on the grounds of "immorality" was un-
constitutionally violative of the first amendment's guarantee of
the "freedom to advocate ideas."'" The obscenity issue was not
reached in the majority opinion. But the decision, while unanimous
in result, produced six opinions; three members of the Court stated
that the film was not obscene, but gave no explanation for this con-
clusion.5
2
A few months after Kingsley Pictures was handed down, Smith
v. California3 added scienter as a requirement in criminal prosecu-
tions for violations of obscenity statutes. The Court unanimously
determined that the conviction of a news dealer for trading in al-
ledgedly obscene materials5 4 under an ordinance not making knowl-
body normally covered in public. It is apparent from advertisements
therein contained that they are offered freely for sale to the general
public who are not members of the nudist organization. The photo-
graphs appear to be obscene and indecent when judged by the
ordinary community standards of the vast majority of the citizens
of our country.
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 128 F. Supp. 564, 573 (D.D.C. 1955).
" "For a brief period following the four per curiain pronouncements,
the law and obscenity were in limbo. Fortunately, Mr. Average American
was not aware of the impact of these reversals without benefit of
explanation." Slough & McAnany 314.
"360 U.S. 684 (1959).
50The dominent theme of the film may be summed up in a few words
-- exhaltation of illicit sexual love in derogation of the restraints
of marriage .... [The principal characters'] relationship was pre-
sented as a true marriage. Their complete surrender to the baser
instincts was presented as a triumph over the social mores. Their
decision to live in adultery was quietly heralded as a conquest of
love over the "form" of marriage. And this entire theme was
woven about scenes which unmistakably suggested and showed acts
of sexual immorality.
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. 4 N.Y.2d
349, 356, 151 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1958).
"Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
"Id. at 702 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker, JJ.,
concurring).
s361 U.S. 147 (1959).
' [W]e have considered the book as a whole, under tests that the
appellant contends are applicable. There are obvious common-sense
limits to the "over all" view. We are not persuaded that a bawdy
house is any the less a brothel, because many of the rooms of the
19641
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edge of the contents an element' must be overturned. The decision,
however, produced five opinions, all of which rested on procedural
rather than substantive points." No clarification of the nature of
obscenity was forthcoming. While it established firmly that the
dealer had to know that he was trafficking in obscene goods, the
Court specifically declined to elaborate upon the nature of the neces-
sary knowledge."
Again two years elapsed before the Court decided a case hinting
of censorship. Then, in a five-to-four decision, it upheld a municipal
ordinance requiring the submission of motion picture films prior to
licensing.5" The majority saw nothing to make the ordinance void
on its face, 9 but the minority argued that the procedure allowed
unlimited censorship." What effect the fact that no contention was
made that the film was obscene had upon the decision must be left
to conjecture, but the Court indicated that the Roth doctrine would
be broad enough if coupled with Kingsley Books to allow some
prior restraint.6 '
However, the Court would not accept wholesale seizure under a
warrant issued before judicial determination that the material was
in fact obscene, for during the next term in Marcus v. Search War-
rant of Property, a case involving search and seizure under a
house may be occupied with dining and dancing, in view of what
goes on in the bedrooms. A book is not necessarily clean or not
obscene because some of the chapters or paragraphs leading to the
bedroom, couch, summerhouse or other available place themselves
do not describe the details of adulterous fornication nor rape.
People v Smith, 161 Cal. App. 2d 860, 863, 327 P.2d 636, 638 (1958).
"'Los ANGELES, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE, § 41.01.1.
" Mr. justice Brennan, joined by four others, held that by not requiring
scienter the ordirlance would tend to restrict circulation of constitutionally
protected material. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959). Mr.
justice Black stated that Congress cannot restrict the freedom of speech
and press because of first amendment safeguards and that this limitation
is carried over to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 159 (con-
curring opinion). Mr. Justice Douglas would have allowed the suppression
of expression only when that expression is inseparable from some illegal
action. Id. at 168 (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Frankfurter would
have reversed on a due process point regarding the exclusion of testimony
concerning the literary merits of the material. Id. at 166 (concurring
opinion). Mr. Justice Harlan would have remanded for a new trial on
substantially the same grounds set forth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Id. at
171 (separate opinion).
"7Id. at 154.
"' Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
59 Id. at 50.
"' Id. at 55, 78 (dissenting opinions).61Id. at 48.
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Missouri statute,12 the Court was unanimous in its belief that con-
stitutional safeguards had been breached.63 The safeguards afforded
under the New York procedure approved in Kingsley Books pro-
vided the basis for distinguishing that case from Marcus.64 Because
the decision turned on this procedural issue, the obscenity of the
material was not touched upon by the Court.6 5
A similar procedural decision could have been made a year later
when Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day66 was decided. The Post
Office Department had determined that the material was unmail-
able.6 7 Injunctive relief for the owners was denied by the district
court6 8 and the court of appeals.6" The Supreme Court reversed,
but could not agree upon an opinion. The Justices felt that the
reversal could be based upon the procedural point that the postal
authorities have no statutory authority to determine what should
be excluded from the mails,"0 upon the substantive ground that the
" Under the provisions of Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.380 (1949), a warrant
for seizure of alledgedly obscene material would issue on the strength of
a sworn complaint filed with a judge or magistrate based upon positive
fact, rather than information or belief, or if there were presented evidential
facts from which the judge or magistrate could determine probable cause.
In the case appealed, the owner of the property was not afforded a hearing
before the warrant issued; the proceeding was ex parte. The statute re-
quired that a date not less than five nor more than twenty days after
seizure had to be set for a hearing, but no time limit was specified for a
decision. If the material was found to be obscene it was destroyed; if not,
it was returned.
" Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Seven
members ruled on due process grounds, two on a fourth amendment issue
that the warrant was too general.
"Ibid.
"The publications seized included so-called 'girlie' magazines, nudist
magazines, treatises and manuals on sex, photography magazines, cartoon
and joke books and still photographs." Id. at 723 n.8. "Because of the
result which we reach, it is unnecessary to decide ... whether the publica-
tions condemned are obscene under the test of . .. [Roth]." Id. at 753 n.9.
00370 U.S. 478 (1962).
Our own independent examination of the magazines leads us to
conclude that the most that can be said of them is that they are
dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdy. But this is not enough to
make them "obscene." Divorced from their "prurient interest"
appeal to the unfortunate persons whose patronage they are aimed
at capturing (a separate issue), these portrayals of the male nude
cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than many portray-
als of the female nude that society tolerates. Of course not every
portrayal of male or female nudity is obscene.
Id. at 489-90.
" See Manual Enterprises v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"Id. at 456.
7' Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 495 (1962) (separate opin-
ion of Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas J.).
1964]
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material was not obscene, 71 or upon grounds not stated.72  There
was one dissent,7 and two Justices did not participate. A most
significant breakthrough in the decision, however, was the fact that
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion expressed for the first time the theory
that the Court had a function of ultimate censorship and that in
determining the community standards as required by Roth the na-
tion as a whole was the community. He was careful, though, to
limit this to federal cases.
74
Finally, eight months after Manual Enterprises, in an eight-to-
one decision that produced four opinions, the Court condemned the
activities of a legislatively created state commission which attempted
to influence book distributors not to handle publications it found
objectionable.7' Again, due process provided a basis for decision
and the obscenity issue was not reached.70
Jacobellis and Quantity of Books do nothing to assuage the
diversity in obscenity decisions77 and little to solidify a basis for
trial court findings in obscenity cases.78 The cases do, however,
continue to describe guidelines.
' 'Id. at 479 (separate opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.).
"2Justice Black concurred without opinion. Id. at 495.
' Id. at 519.
" Id. at 488.
"Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
" Among the paperback books listed by the Commission as 'objection-
able' were [METALIOUS, PEYTON PLACE (1956)] . . . and [MERGENDAIlL,
THE BRAmBLE Busn (1958)] .... " Id. at 61-62. "Most of the other 106
publications which, as of January 1960, had been listed as objectionable
by the Commission were issues of such magazines as 'Playboy,' 'Rogue,'
'Frolic,' and so forth." Id. at 62 n.4.
"In five major obscenity cases, the Court has produced an amazing
twenty-two separate opinions: Roth (four); Kingsley Pictures
(six); Smith (five); Manual Enterprises (three); Bantam Books
(four). The lines of division have tended to follow the polarities
of Justices Black and Douglas, on the one hand, and Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other.
Slough & McAnany 336 n.205. Jacobellis and Quantity of Books add two
cases and nine opinions. The polarity apparently is weakening.
7s Seven years after the "standard" was adopted in Roth, the lower
courts were confused sufficiently to be split on MILLER, TIIE TROPIC OF
CANCER (1961). For cases finding the book not obscene, see Zeitlin v.
Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963); Attorney-General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer,"
345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d 328 (1962); McCauley v. "Tropic of Cancer,"
20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963). For cases finding the book
obscene, see Grove Press, Inc. v. Florida, 156 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963), rev'd sub nora. Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 377 U.S. 577
(1964) (per curiam); Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962);
People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
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Quantity of Books indicates that any in rem proceeding must
possess the characteristics of the New York procedure approved in
Kingsley Books in order to survive the courts, if indeed any such
proceeding would now be upheld by the Supreme Court. The At-
torney General of Kansas had sought to avoid the pitfalls of Marcus
even though the Kansas statute was almost identical to that of
Missouri. The Court found his attempts lacking. 9 The Court went
to great lengths to distinguish Kingsley Books on its facts from
both Quantity of Books and Marcus after flatly stating that the
Kansas officials had attempted to avoid the shortcomings found in
Marcus." The implication is that the connotation of prior restraint
is assuming more importance as a basis for denouncing the in rem
proceedings in obscenity cases. The growing importance of the
prior restraint question, coupled with the separate opinion in
Quantity of Books arguing for reversal on the grounds that the
material was not obscene8' and the cases holding adversely to the
distributor when the substantive findings were not attacked, 2 now
make it doubtful that any obscenity case arising hereafter in the
in rent context will be argued solely on the procedural issues.
Rather, the Supreme Court may be called upon for ultimate
review, for although the Justices were unable to agree upon a ma-
jority opinion, Jacobellis contains the first judicial recognition that
the logical extension of the Roth doctrine requires the Court to
determine independently the national community standard of ob-
scenity as fact. 3 All of the opinions agreed at least upon the point
that "obscenity" is difficult of definition. It is possible that the
eventual fate of obscenity litigation is indicated by Mr. Justice
Stewart's five sentence opinion, which he ends by saying:
I have reached the conclusion... that... criminal laws in this
area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I
Grove Press was decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as Jacobel-
lis and Quantity of Books.
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 209 (1964).80Id. at 209-13.
'1 Id. at 214 (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.).
82 See authorities cited notes 24 & 38 supra.
Separate opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Goldberg. Id.
at 189-90. Chief Justice Warren vigorously attacked the propositions that
the Court should constitute a "super censor" and that national standards
are to be imposed. Id. at 200-02. Justice Harlan was equally insistent
that the authority of his decision in Manual Enterprises for independent
review under a national community standard should be limited to the facts
of that case, specifically, federal litigation. Id. at 203.
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shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But
I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that.8 4
One commentator suggests that the Supreme Court has enunci-
ated a "three-pronged test," to wit, the material must appeal to
sexual or scatalogical interests, it must be considered as a whole,
and it must be patently offensive; he then suggests that because
this test is impossible of application lawyers in advising their clients
and judges in framing their charges in obscenity cases must con-
sider not what the Supreme Court has said but what it has done. 5
This suggestion overlooks the necessity of also considering the
statutes and practice of the jurisdiction.
North Carolina has a forward looking statute dealing with ob-
scenity as a substantive violation."8 It was the first state to adopt
the Model Penal Code provision,8 T doing so two weeks before Roth
was handed down.88 These provisions have been criticized for mak-
ing the intended audience a factor in their test, for making a broad
range of evidence admissible to determine the fact of obscenity, and
for excluding non-commercial dissemination from liability. 9 It is
submitted that no other criteria is available if the impact upon the
intended audience is eliminated as a test and that a broad range
of evidence is necessary and desirable to provide a true evaluation
of the material;"° further, all non-commercial dissemination is not
eliminated. 1 The Model Penal Code provisions are the most work-
able yet devised in an area in which the Supreme Court admits
probable impossibility of adequate definition.02
North Carolina has no specific procedural provisions for deal-
ing with obscenity. The only legislation in this area merely places
an affirmative burden upon the several sheriffs to report violations
of the obscenity provisions to the proper judicial officials who are
8 Id. at 197.
" Gerber 84041." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (Supp. 1963).
,Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 8 (1957).
88 Note, 36 N.C.L. Rzv. 189 (1958).
"Gerber 838-39.
90 See MODEL PENAL, CODE § 207.10, comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1(c) (1) (Supp. 1963).
"' Note, 36 N.C.L. Rlv. 189 (1958). See generally Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 191, 197, 199, 204 (1964).
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then to issue warrants "to cause such violators to come before
their courts for immediate trial."93 It appears that this is no more
than a legislative admonition to the named officials to perform their
duties. The procedure set forth can not be distinguished from other
criminal proceedings. Certainly the provision is not broad enough
to support a pre-hearing seizure as attempted in Marcus and Quan-
tity of Books. Whether enactment of a provision similar to the New
York statute that establishes an injunctive procedure is desirable is
a question appropriate and ripe for legislative inquiry.
As a matter of practice, however, North Carolina apparently
has not attempted to control judicially the dissemination of literary
material. There were no obscenity cases reported in North Caro-
lina prior to the enactment of the present law.94 There has been
only one since, which dealt with non-commercial exhibition to chil-
dren rather than commercial dissemination.9 5
It is possible that the insulation of children from certain ma-
terial may be the primary aim of obscenity legislation."" And if
not the primary aim, it may be the only remaining effective use of
obscenity statutes. From the cases already decided, some insight
is gained into the feeling of the Supreme Court toward printed
material now in circulation. It must be remembered that the Court
has not given blanket approval to all printed matter, but an examina-
tion of the works so far approved makes it difficult to perceive
what might be held obscene. However, the Court steadfastly main-
tains its resolve to develop the law case by case. Material more
offensive than that already presented to the Court or directed at a
particular audience, such as children, may well support a proper
conviction. Provided the procedural requirements are met, the
North Carolina statute appears adequate to limit effectively distri-
bution of salacious material to children.97
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-191 (1953).
"'Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 189, 198 (1958).
" State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 117 S.E.2d 849 (1961). The defendant
was accused of exhibiting obscene photographs to three girls aged fourteen,
ten, and eight. His conviction was reversed on the ground that the warrant
and indictment, while copying the words of the statutory definition of
obscenity, was too indefinite.
" See Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The Role of the F.B.I.,
25 U. PiTr. L. REv. 469 (1964); Comment, Youth, Obscenity and the Law,
1 WASHBURN L.J. 220 (1961).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (c) (Supp. 1963). It has been sug-
gested, however, that the North Carolina statute is constitutionally unsound
under the doctrine of Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 159 (1959), in that the
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The absence of cases of commercial distribution of pornography
in the North Carolina Reports indicates either that there is no such
distribution in this state or that there is no effort to restrict it. 8
provisions allow scienter to be presumed. See Note, 38 N.C.L. REv. 634
(1960)." The possibility also exists that distribution is being effectively re-
stricted without recourse to the appellate courts. Whatever the explanation
of the absence of reported "censorship" cases, recent news reports would
indicate that the matter is topical.
In a case involving the film Black Silk and Soft Skin, a theater operator
was arrested and charged with "exhibiting an immoral and obscene motion
picture" after a private citizen had filed a complaint and the sheriff had
warned the operator to discontinue exhibition. Charlotte Observer, Oct. 4,
1964, § C, p. 1, col. 1. The sheriff believed the film to be obscene because
"the girls stripped down to their shoes and stockings." Id., Sept. 27, 1964,
§ C, p. 1, col. 4. The operator was found not guilty in Record's Court, id.,
Oct. 21, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1, thus precluding consideration of the matter
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
In another county the sheriff appointed a citizens committee to review
publications offered for sale in the county. Id., Oct. 7, 1964, § C, p. 1, col.
5. A three man sub-committee apparently decided what was obscene, al-
though all of the publications were not read by all three and there were
conflicting reports as to whether the whole committee saw all of the books.
The publications were divided among the sub-committee and "perused" with
this "rule of thumb" as a standard:
The nude body is not itself obscene; however, when nudity is
used to arouse lustful desires, it becomes obscene. The nude body
shown in positions or poses normally used by respectable modeling
or photography concerns is not obscene.
If, however, the nude body is shown in provocative, suggestive,
lewd or other positions which seem to invite sexual activity be-
tween men and women, it thereby becomes obscene.
Id., Oct. 4, 1964, § C, p. 1, col. 5.
The committee advised the sheriff that the magazines Ace, Adam, Bache-
lor, Calvacade, Dude, Frolic, Gent, Gentleman, Madcap, Modern Man, Re-
.treat, Sir, Swank, Yes, and the Police Gazette and all paperback books
published by the Rapture, Leisure, Pillar and Ember companies were ob-
scene. Id., Oct. 2, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 8. Armed with this report, the sheriff
sent letters to selected newsstand operators in the county ordering removal
of the publications. After the dealers indicated an unwillingness to comply,
the sheriff announced that arrests would be made. Faced with this ultimatum
the operators capitulated temporarily. Id., Oct. 3, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 5.
Later, promised financial support by the publishers, the dealers threatened
to test the legality of the action. Id., Oct. 6, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1.
At this juncture spokesmen for the committee stated that the group had
not been too hopeful of success and that it had not been anticipated that
the sheriff would take immediate action. A meeting between the operators
and the committee was scheduled. Id., Oct. 9, 1964, § C, p. 1, col. 8. At the
meeting it was announced that the operators were free to place on the
stands any material they thought was not obscene. "And the committee
left the unspecified threat of arrest by the sheriff if the voluntary system
does not work." Id., Oct. 23, 1964, § C, p. 1, col. 1. The committee attempted
to give the dealers some insight into the standards to be used in judging
material by using as exhibits two fold-out pictures taken from representa-
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Either reason, considered with the growing aversion9 9 toward the
in rem action, suggests that an injunctive procedure similar to that
expressly approved in Kingsley Books and used as a standard in
Marcus and Quantity of Books would be unused or unenforceable
legislation. The present North Carolina substantive statute, how-
ever, provides an adequate basis for criminal prosecution and an
acceptable charge to a jury, for in all of the cases since 1957 the
majority has accepted the Roth doctrine as controlling. This leaves.
as the crucial question in such prosecution the issue of obscenity in
fact, and Jacobellis indicates that this point can be settled with
finality only by the Supreme Court of the United States.
ROBERT A. MELOTT
Constitutional Law-Right to Retained
Counsel at Time of Arrest
Escobedo v. Illinois' presented once more to the Supreme Court
the problem of when the right to counsel attaches. Defendant was
brought to police headquarters after being implicated in a murder.
At the time of his interrogation, he was not formally charged; but
he "couldn't walk out the door."2 When told that he had been
tive magazines, Yes, which the committee found objectionable, and Play-
boy, which it did not. The spokesman said:
If you look at... [the one from Yes] you'll see-I don't know
what kind of a grimace you would call that on her face .... It
is such grimaces on the faces that would allow lustful desires to be
aroused .... [But] the picture from Playboy . .. [is] respectable
photography.
Ibid. The dilemma faced by the dealers might have been expressed by the
chief of police of the county seat, a member of the committee, who had
said "I don't know what's obscene. I'd hate to be the one deciding." Id.,
Oct. 6, 1964, § B, p. 1, col. 1.
On the limited facts reported by the newspaper the case would appear
to be similar to Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), with
the position of the committee equally indefensible. See notes 75 & 76 and
accompanying text supra. But whatever the legality of the action taken,
the case illustrates several important points: "obscenity" is a subjective
matter difficult of definition, especially by committee; operators of local
commercial outlets will resist attempts to control distribution; those opera-
tors will be supported in their resistance by financially strong publishers;
the most effective control may lie in moral suasion aimed at the general
public.
' See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
378 U.S. 478 (1964). For a discussion of the case before the Supreme
Court decision, see Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964).
2 378 U.S. at 479.
